Their simulation analysis provides insight into the This paper explores changes in traditional comcomparative effects of these policy approaches on modity programs from the perspective of domestic income level and stability. They concluded that stawelfare. A theoretical model was developed which bilization policy is superior to historical policy in describes domestic welfare changes that follow from reducing income variability and superior to marketpolicies consistent with reductions in international determined policy for purposes of generating farm price distortions. The model was applied to the 1985 income. Despite the advantages of the stabilization Farm Bill. This provided an historical example of a approach from an economic viewpoint, the adoption policy change that simultaneously improves domesof a policy that bears no relationship to production tic welfare and reduces protectionism.
istorically, the nite Stadomestic welfare and reducing trade distortions siH1istorically, the United States government has multaneously through modification of existing comemployed a variety of policy instruments to promote modity programs. The focus here is on grains, since the domestic goal of farm income support. The rethe bulk of U.S. government support is designated sponse of government over six decades to agriculfor that sector. Furthermore, since the U.S. is a large tural sector interests has had massive redistributional country in the international grain trade, prices in the consequences for taxpayers and consumers as well U.S. drive world prices (Gardner, 1987, Chapter 11) . as for farmers. In addition, the objective of income
The next section describes policy instruments and transfer to domestic farmers has driven agricultural establishes a theoretical framework which is foltrade policy and in the process produced a wide lowed by an examination of welfare consequences range of trade distortions.
of specific policy changes. The theoretical results are Some recent agricultural trade liberalization recapplied to the 1985 Farm Bill and its effects on the ommendations (Blanford, deGorter, and Harvey; de- wheat and corn sectors. Gorter; Grennes) point out that there need not be a conflict between the goals of farm income support THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK and freer trade. These objectives are compatible if Policy instruments in the U.S. grain sector are distortion between domestic and foreign prices is threefold. Under the loan rate instrument, the Comavoided. Decoupling of payments to farmers from modity Credit Corporation (CCC) is required by law production levels would reduce domestic as well as to accept grain from eligible producers in exchange international price distortions while retaining indifor a loan price fixed in legislation. The loan rate vidual national control over the level of income therefore functions as a support price. CCC grain transfer to farmers. A radical form of decoupling is stocks increase in years when the market price falls lump-sum payments that bear no direct relationship below the loan rate plus interest. The government to production. Alternatively, farm policy reform can also provides subsidies or deficiency payments. concentrate on decreasing the price incentives to These are the difference between a legislated target overproduce. Both approaches would simultaneprice and the higher of the loan rate or the market ously reduce trade distorting effects.
price. The target price, a guaranteed producer price, McDowell et al. contrast historical, market-deter- provides an incentive to produce the crop. Finally, mined, and sector-wide stabilization programs acreage reduction programs require that farmers set which decouple farm income support from farmaside a percentage of base acreage in order to become level decision making for the period 1970-1982. eligible for either CCC loans or deficiency pay- ments. Farmers choose to participate in the program curve can be conceptualized as a function of price pt, if the expected benefits of participation exceed the with P', R, and P" causing shifts in the curve, and the expected costs. The three policy tools operate simulnonparticipant supply curve as a function of price P', taneously, affording policymakers a variety of policy with p', R, and P" causing the curve to shift. options.
Government purchase of grain, Qg (P, pt), is such The relevance of the loan rate to farm policy dethat the market will clear at the support price, P. pends upon whether or not the market price is higher Equilibrium occurs where than the loan rate. In years when the market price remains above the loan rate, consumers respond to (3) Qs = Qd + Q the market price, and producers respond to both the target price and the market price. In years when the . . . Equation (3) is equivalent to equilibrium condition loan rate effectively supports the market price at the level set in legislation, it is equivalent to the market price and becomes an important tool to which both (4 Q(Q Q) consumers and producers are responsive. The theoretical model that follows develops this latter case.
or, excess supply in the U.S. is equal to excess Consider the static case of the U.S. as a large demand in the rest of the world. The world price of country in the international market for grain. The grain is equivalent to the U.S. price, which is sup-U.S. is an exporting country that faces the excess ported at P' by CCC intervention. demand of the rest of the world. Assume that supply is at trend level, that the CCC is acquiring stocks, and WELFARE EFFECTS OF POLICY that the loan rate is set such that it operates as a price CHANGES floor. The government can manipulate supply floor. The government can manipulate supply This section takes a welfare theoretic approach to through the use of three policy tools. Let P' represent analyzing the effects of changes in the policy varithe loan rate. This is the price paid by domestic a . pp pp ables. Pioneering work in applying this approach to consumers and foreigners purchasing U.S. grain, and agricultural programs was done by Wallace (1962) it is also the price received by nonparticipating supby ae (19 with more recent contributions by Gardner (1983) pliers. The target price, p t , is the price received by and Lichtenberg and Zilberman (1986) suppliers who participate in the government program by agreeing to set aside a percentage, R, of their Analysis begins with an objective function, or base acreage where 0 R 1. social welfare function, where producer surplus, Thq demand facing suppliers may be described as consumer surplus, and the net revenue position of the Treasury resulting from a given policy are the inde- pendent arguments. The interest is in a policy that reduces trade distortions in a manner that does not Qh is the domestic component of demand and Qf is compromise domestic welfare. In evaluating conthe foreign component. Domestic supply is represumer welfare, we therefore ignore benefits to forsented by eigners. We assume further that welfare weights are the same for all three interest groups. The social (2) Qs (Pl, P, R, pa) = QP (P, P t , R, pa) + welfare function is defined Qn (pl, P, R, pa) (5) SW = CS + PS + BS where QP is participating farmer and Qn is nonparticipating farmer supply. pa is the price farmers exwhere CS is domestic consumer surplus, PS is propect to receive by planting alternative crops.
ducer surplus accruing to participating and nonparParticipant supply responds positively to pt, the ticipating farmers, BS is the federal budget surplus guaranteed producer price; nonparticipant supply and responds positively to PI, the price received by nonparticipants. An increase in R or a decrease in p (5a) CS = -Qh dP' will reduce the incentive for program participation and increase the nonparticipant component of supply. Conversely, a decrease in P' or R will induce (5b) PS =fQP dP t +SQn dPl, and farmers to enroll more acreage in the government program. Both components of supply respond posi--P ( pi) tively to a decrease in pa. The participant supply
The first term in the budget surplus expression is loan rate will result in an improvement in welfare the cost to government of deficiency payments; the expressed in elasticities form is therefore second term is the cost of the CCC loan program.
The parameter represents the value of the grain in (9) Qf/ Qd < q (Q/ Qd) + I,11
the hands of the CCC expressed as a percentage of P'; (1 -O)P' is the real cost to taxpayers of the grain where lnI , and 1 d,l are the loan rate elasticities of acquisition.
nonparticipating supply and of demand, respecChanges in any of the policy instruments will tively. Equation (9), the first order condition for affect domestic welfare. However only changes in maximization of domestic welfare with respect to the variable PI will alter the amount of trade distortion loan rate, indicates that an improvement in welfare since world price as well as the domestic price is is possible through use of the loan rate instrument supported at that level. For the policy goal of maxiwhile maintaining a constant target price. The lower mization of social welfare through use of the loan the share of exports in disappearance and the higher rate, the relevant first order condition for a maximum the demand elasticity, the greater the opportunity for is welfare gain through a reduction in the loan rate, as more benefit is captured by domestic consumers (6) aSW/aP'= through the lower price. The higher the loan rate elasticity of supply of nonparticipants, the less they -Qh +JQiPdP t + Qn _ QiPPt + QlPP + Qp will be hurt by a lower price. Lowering of the loan -(1 -0) (Q,Pp + QP + Q n P 1 + Qn _ Qldpl -Qd) rate to reduce trade distortions might be particularly = Q + QPdP--Qpp-
opportune in the case of corn. A large share in world exports is provided by the U.S., yet most corn pro-+ 0 (Qg + Q gPI) = 0, duced in the U.S. is utilized domestically.
This paper focuses on the loan rate because of its where subscripts indicate partial derivatives. The direct effect on world prices. While the goal of value of the parameter 0 depends on the amount of reducing trade distortions can be undertaken through revenue the government receives in future years adjustment of this policy tool, the target price instruwhen stocks may be sold in times of drought or ment can be established for the purpose of supportunanticipated increase in export demand minus the ing farm income. Adjustment of the target price will transaction costs of purchasing and disposing of the not affect the world price, which is established at P' stocks, storage costs, waste, and social costs due to in the case we are considering, but it has domestic disruption of markets into which surpluses are sent.
welfare and redistributional consequences. Partial Gardner (1987, p. 64) points out that these latter equilibrium effects of changes in this variable for the costs are high which implies a low value of 0. If the case 0 = 0 yields the following value of the stocks is exhausted by the losses, then 0 is equal to zero.' If this scenario is adopted, equation (6) reduces to
In the case of a nonparticipant supply curve linear (7) Qf + Q1P dP t -QPPt -Q n e pl + QdPl = 0.
in Pl and p t , fQndP' = Qtnp and Equation (7) can be simplified for the case of a (11) OSW / p = -QtpP t < 0. participant supply curve linear in P' and Pt. The integral fQLP dPt is equivalent to the expression Equation (11) indicates that reduction of the target price is welfare improving. Because the cost to gov-QP't ,and equation (7) can be rewnritten ernment of the deficiency payments exceeds the benefits to farmers, the target price is an inefficient (8) Qf = Q 1 np -Qidpl mechanism for supporting farm income. Direct payments that do not elicit an excess supply could Equation (8) implicitly defines the optimal loan achieve the same benefit level for farmers at lower rate. The condition under which a reduction in the taxpayer expense.
Incorporation of the potential benefits due to future sale of government surplus would require a dynamic model. The assumption that 0 equals zero does not imply that government should not purchase stocks at world prices for security purposes.
The acreage reduction requirement has supply efforeign competitors were guaranteed price increases fects opposite to those of deficiency payments. An which subsequently encouraged increases in producincrease in R reduces QP by the incremental set aside tion. The Food Security Act (Farm Bill) of 1985 requirement in addition to the acreage that farmers revised this legislation for the next five years by choose to remove from the program. This acreage slashing the loan rates and maintaining higher target may be used for production of other crops, or it may prices. The concern behind the legislation was that be planted with the same crop, increasing Qn. A the existing program was distorting market signals larger R decreases participating producer surplus leaving the U.S. at a competitive disadvantage. The and increases that of nonparticipants. The effects on Farm Bill of 1990 more specifically addressed budgthe budget surplus are positive, due to the decrease etary pressures by decreasing the acreage eligible for both in deficiency payments and in government acsupport payments. The 1985 legislation, because of quisitions. The net welfare change depends on the its focus on the loan rate, provides an excellent specific supply effects of R. If gains to taxpayers and example of the use of this policy tool. This section nonparticipants outweigh losses to participants, then applies the above theory to the 1985 Farm Bill. Net acreage controls can be used to counter social losses welfare is determined by examining the effects of the due to target prices. The controls offset the increased policy change on each of the following groups: doproduction incentive brought about by the target mestic consumers, participating farmers, nonparticiprice. Simultaneous use of both controls is a second pating farmers, and taxpayers. The bulk of the loan best policy in which one distortion serves to reduce rate drop went into effect in the 1986/87 crop year. rather than increase social losses due to the other. For
For that reason the focus is on welfare changes furtherdiscussion ofthe supply effects ofthe acreage occurring in 1986/87. aln addition to the target price and loan rate supports, additional payments per bushel foregone were made for a percentage of the required acreage diversion for some years. bPercentage of base acres enrolled in Acreage Reduction Programs. of the OLS demand estimation are listed in Table 2 . Because domestic price elasticities are low, exports where PA P is participating planted acreage and PA is play a key role in clearing stocks when the loan rate total planted acreage. This decomposition assumes changes.
that the ratio of harvested to planted acreage is the The target price mechanism was introduced in same for participants and nonparticipants. Measures 1974. Given how recently this policy was impleof the variables used in calculation of QP and Qf were mented, there is only a brief period of time during obtained from Agricultural Outlook (USDA).
2 which all three price support instruments have been Because the loan rate is in operation as a price floor in effect. Estimation of their supply effects is thereduring the time period of this analysis, P' is used as fore difficult. (This difficulty is also reported by Burt a measure of expected price of wheat and corn at the 2 Total planted acreage (PA) was obtained directly. The values of actual production (QS) and participating acreage (PA P) were calculated as follows: QS = HA * Y, PA P = (r * B) -S, where HA (total harvested acreage), r (participation rate), B (base acreage), and S (acreage set aside) were also obtained directly from the data sources. Y is the value of trend yield, which was estimated from linear regressions of yield over time performed for the period 1950-86. The resulting yields for 1985 and 1986 were 37.4 and 38.0 for wheat and 112.2 and 114.4 for corn. time of planting decisions for nonparticipants. In the pi outweighed the increase in R in 1986, causing an participant equation, target prices for wheat and corn outward shift in the participating supply curve and are used.
3 (The loan rate for soybeans was used in an inward shift in the nonparticipating supply curve. each equation; a target price program for soybeans
The changes in consumer surplus and producer was not in effect.) The values of a, P and 5 are surplus are calculated according to the welfare exdetermined by incorporating own-and cross-price pressions contained in equation (5) where Qh, QP, elasticities used in recent work.
4 Given values of and Q" have the functional forms developed above. quantities, prices, and coefficients, the supply curves (To isolate the effects of changing prices, the income are completed by solving for the intercept terms (K) and domestic disappearance lagged values are fixed in equation (13). The components of the supply at their 1985 levels.) 5 The budget surplus as deequations are listed in Table 3 . scribed in equation (5c) is affected through changes The supply elasticities of P' and R for participants in both the cost of deficiency payments and of the and of P t and R for nonparticipants are not known. loan program. The values of QP and Qn in (5c) are as Shifts in supply due to changes in these variables are listed in Table 3 . CCC acquisitions for 1985 and therefore captured through the change in the inter-1986 were calculated as follows cept term. In both sectors, the.dramatic decrease in (16) Qg Q + Q -Qd , prices. It was also demonstrated theoretically that lower target prices reduce the cost to taxpayers by an where Qd is domestic and foreign demand (total amount that exceeds losses to producers. The model disappearance).
was applied to the 1985 Farm Bill effects on the Social welfare changes are listed in Table 4 . The wheat and corn sectors. The major difficulty in anawheat sector shows a welfare gain of 72 million lyzing the policy empirically is locating the supply dollars in the higher elasticity case and of 15 million curve. Because program participation is voluntary, in the lower elasticity case. Corn experienced gains farmers face two different price incentives. Little is of 458 million dollars in the higher and 319 million known about the supply responsiveness of producers dollars in the lower elasticity case. The larger welfare to the three separate policy instruments that constigains for corn reflect the lower share of exports in tute the farm program. More understanding of these domestic disappearance of that crop. Producers in relationships is needed in order to design better both sectors are net losers because the losses to policy. The foreign component is also a major factor nonparticipants outweigh the gains to participants.
influencing the effects of U.S. programs. This is also Government is also a net loser since the savings due an area in need of more research. Wheat exports in to lower Qg are more than offset by the cost of particular account for roughly one half of annual increased deficiency payments. Wheat receives disappearance. Yet because of changing farm poliabout 8 times as much new support as corn; the cies in importing and other exporting countries, forhigher deficiency payments for wheat in 1986 were eign demand is most difficult to pinpoint, and not offset by savings in CCC payments as in the corn estimates of demand elasticity vary widely. sector. Although the corn sector shows a significant This paper is a partial analysis of a complicated welfare gain under the 1986 program, the redistribufarm program. It perhaps raises more questions than tional effect is a substantial shift in favor of consumit answers. The static model developed here has ers, with a reduction in the welfare of both taxpayers considered only the case in which the loan rate and producers. It was anticipated that the 1985 Farm supports the market price. A dynamic model is Bill would provide a major boost to foreign demand needed to handle random supply disturbances which and a consequent increase in U.S. exports that would cause market prices to rise above the loan rate. Such reduce the burden on U.S. taxpayers. The role of a model would also be capable of dealing with the increased exports following the price cuts was overissue of the value of grain in the hands of the CCC.
